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Many real-world multilayer systems such as critical infrastructure are interdependent and em-
bedded in space with links of a characteristic length. They are also vulnerable to localized attacks
or failures, such as terrorist attacks or natural catastrophes, which affect all nodes within a given
radius. Here we study the effects of localized attacks on spatial multiplex networks of two layers.
We find a metastable region where a localized attack larger than a critical size induces a nucleation
transition as a cascade of failures spreads throughout the system, leading to its collapse. We de-
velop a theory to predict the critical attack size and find that it exhibits novel scaling behavior. We
further find that localized attacks in these multiplex systems can induce a previously unobserved
combination of random and spatial cascades. Our results demonstrate important vulnerabilities in
real-world interdependent networks and show new theoretical features of spatial networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The important subject of vulnerability of complex sys-
tems has garnered much interest for many years. Most in-
frastructure is embedded in space, for example the power
grid and sewer networks, and thus, several models have
been proposed for understanding the vulnerability of spa-
tially embedded networks [1–9]. In addition, in recent
years, world-wide human, technological, social and eco-
nomic systems have become more and more integrated
and interdependent [10–15]. Therefore, it is necessary
to realistically model these systems as interdependent in
order to understand their structure, function and vulner-
abilities [16–27]. Studies on spatially embedded interde-
pendent networks found that in many cases they are sig-
nificantly more vulnerable than non-embedded systems
FIG. 1: Phase diagram of the critical attack size rch.
Dependence of the critical attack size rch on the average degree
〈k〉 and the characteristic length ζ. The color bar in the right
represent the size of rch. In this figure L = 1500, averaged
over 5 runs for each data point.
[23, 28–35].
Though most research on resilience of complex systems
considers random failures, in many cases, nodes fail in
localized areas, due to natural catastrophes, terrorist at-
tack or other failures. Recent studies show that localized
attacks on some systems are significantly more damaging
[36–45].
Here, we study localized attacks on a realistic spatial
multiplex model that has been proposed recently [46, 47].
The system is a model of multiplex with exponential link-
length distribution of connectivity links in each of the two
layers:
P (r) ∼ exp(− r
ζ
). (1)
Here ζ is a parameter determining the characteristic link
length and thereby the strength of the embedding — a
smaller ζ reflects a stronger embedding. We further as-
sume that the nodes require connectivity in each layer in
order to function, a requirement which is equivalent to
having dependency links of length zero with longer con-
nectivity links. This is in contrast to the research based
on the model of Li et al. [30] and Berezin et al. [38] which
considered the case where dependency links are longer
then connectivity links. We suggest that the assumption
of dependency links which are shorter than connectiv-
ity links is more natural, because, for example, it is more
likely for a communication’s station to receive power from
its nearest power station than a distant one, though the
communications and power networks are known to have
potentially long links [46, 48].
As we show here, the combination of spatially con-
strained connectivity links and multiplex dependency—
both ubiquitous features of real complex systems—makes
these systems vulnerable to potentially catastrophic lo-
calized attacks. Such attacks are important and realistic
because they can represent a local damage on two spa-
tial networks that depend on one another to function in
a very natural way: the nodes are either the same, or
every node in one network layer depend on a close node
in the other.
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FIG. 2: The critical attack size rch — simulations and theory. (a) r
c
h as a function of ζ for four 〈k〉 values. The dotted
lines represent the theory for small and large ζ as obtained from Eqs. (2) and (4) respectively. (b) log(rch/ζ) and (c) log(r
c
h)
as a function of log(〈k〉 − kc) for small and large ζ values, with the 12 exponent (dotted line), predicted by the theory (see Eqs.
(3) and (5)). For this figure L = 2000 with averages over at least 5 runs for each data point.
We find that for a broad range of parameters our sys-
tem is metastable, meaning that a localized attack larger
than a critical size — that is independent of the system
size — induces a cascade of failures which propagates
through the whole system leading to its collapse. We de-
velop a theory which can predict this critical size of the
initial local damage, and can explain the unique cascad-
ing process that makes the critical size independent of
the system size. We find that when the localized attack
is of the critical size — the cascade is at first random
within a disc of radius of order ζ, and then it propagate
spatially until it reaches the boundaries of the system.
Using this theory we also find a new scaling exponent
describing the critical nucleation (of damage) size.
II. MODEL
We model the multiplex composed of two layers in
which the nodes are placed at lattice sites of a square
lattice where the link lengths r are distributed with prob-
ability of Eq. (1) and average degree 〈k〉. Here, we focus
on the case in which both layers have the same character-
istic length ζ and same 〈k〉. In practice, we assign each
node an (x, y) coordinate with integers x, y ∈ [0, 1, ...L),
and construct the links in each layer as follows: (a) We
select randomly a source node (xs, ys) and draw an angle
α selected uniformly at random. (b) We draw a length
r selected from the distribution P (r), Eq. (1). (c) We
select the target node (xt, yt), which is closest to satisfy-
ing, (xt, yt) = (xs, ys) + (r · cosα, r · sinα). This process
is executed independently in each layer and is continued
until we have a total of N〈k〉2 links. The topological model
is similar to the Waxman model [49] and recent work by
Bianconi and Halu et al. [22, 50] with a key difference
being that our model converges to a lattice as ζ → 0.
For a node to remain functional it must be connected
to the giant component in both layers. This reflects the
assumption that in order for the node to continue to func-
tion it requires the two types of connectivity. Next, we
perform a localized attack as follows: (a) We remove all
nodes within a distance rh from a random location in the
system. (b) From the set of the remaining nodes, we re-
move all the nodes that are not in the giant component
of the first layer. (c) We repeat step (b) in the second
layer. (b) and (c) are repeated until there are no nodes to
remove, and we are left with the mutual giant component
(MGC) [16, 17, 51, 52].
At the end of this cascade, the system is categorized
as functional or non-functional depending on whether the
MGC is of the order of the system size L2 or not.
III. RESULTS
We analyzed the damage spreading of the localized at-
tack on the multiplex with different 〈k〉, ζ and rh. Our
simulations suggest the existence of rch, a minimum ra-
dius of damage needed to cause the system to collapse.
Below rch the damage remains localized while for a radius
above rch the damage propagates indefinitely and destroys
the whole multiplex. When we calculate the critical at-
tack size rch for different 〈k〉 and ζ, we discover three
regions, as shown in the phase diagram in Fig.1. The re-
gions are: (a) Stable (in red) — in this region the system
remains functional after a localized attack of any finite
size. (b) Unstable (in blue) — in this region the sys-
tem is non-functional even if no nodes are removed. (c)
Metastable (between the above-mentioned regions) — in
this region only attacks with radius larger than rch prop-
agate, through cascading failures, the entire system and
makes it non-functional.
To understand these phenomena we consider the net-
work as being composed of regions of size of order ζ that
are tiled on a 2D lattice, each of which can be approxi-
mated as a random network. The localized attack of size
rh can then be approximated as a random attack of size
pirh
2 in an interdependent random network with ∼ ζ2
iii
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FIG. 3: Dynamic evolution of cascading failures near the critical point. Propagation of local damage with radius
slightly above the critical size rch. The colors represent the number of iterations (NOI) until the nodes fail. In (b) and (c) we
show a ruler in ζ units (9ζ) for demonstrating the orders of magnitude. For this figure L = 4000, ζ = 50, 〈k〉 = 2.5 and rh = 69.
nodes. In this case, the percolation threshold for random
removals is known to be pc =
kc
〈k〉 , where kc ≈ 2.4554 [16].
It has also been shown that localized attacks (formed by
shells surrounding a root node) in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi multiplex
networks have the same percolation threshold as random
attacks [39, 40].
Based on this, we can predict the critical attack size
rch close to kc as follows:
pi(rch)
2
pi(aζ)2
∼= 1− kc〈k〉 , (2)
from which,
rch
ζ
∼= a ·
√
1− kc〈k〉
∼= a
kc
·
√
〈k〉 − kc, (3)
where a is the constant of proportionality for the effec-
tive random network (radius) size, which we determine
numerically. This rch is the minimal expected size of
the hole that destroys the entire random network regime
(aζ). However, since there are links between the tiled
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi sub-networks, the collapse propagates to-
ward the surrounding sub-networks and we see a typical
spreading cascade in an embedded network.
For the limit of ζ of the order of L, the multiplex
can be well approximated as two interdependent Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi networks, and therefore we can calculate rch as fol-
lows:
pi(rch)
2
L2
∼= 1− kc〈k〉 , (4)
from which,
rch
∼= L√
pi
·
√
1− kc〈k〉
∼= L√
pikc
·
√
〈k〉 − kc. (5)
We show that Eq.(2) and Eq.(4) predict the simulation
results in Fig. 2(a) with a ≈ 9. Because of the long
links and since the sub-networks are not isolated — a is
relatively big. In the supplementary we can see similar
phenomenon on a system with average degree 〈k〉 with
links that connected slightly different. In this alternative
model we choose a node randomly and link it to another
node with link-length distribution of step function up to
ζ, for each of the two layers. In this case, there are no
long links (but the small Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks are still
not isolated) so a is found to be smaller than in our model
(approximately 3.2).
Eq.(3) and Eq.(5) also predict a novel critical exponent
for the scaling of rch with 〈k〉 − kc, which equals 12 . In-
deed the simulations shown in Fig. 2(b) and (c) support
this exponent. Generally, it is difficult to find evidence
for universality in the absence of a second-order transi-
tion. This new scaling, related to nucleation type pro-
cesses, may provide an alternative approach which can
be useful to understand universality properties in critical
phenomena associated with a first-order transition where
nucleation processes are involved [53, 54].
We also find a new dynamical process of cascading
when the localized attack is near the critical size, that
is consistent with our theory. To understand this process
for a given 〈k〉 and ζ, we first find the MGC, and then
we remove a hole with radius rch needed to initiate the
cascading. Fig. 3(a) shows the whole spatial-temporal
process of cascading and Figs. 3 (b) and (c) demonstrate
the different types of NOI in the two regimes as described
below. The graph in Fig. 4(a), of 〈r〉, the average dis-
tance from the center of the nodes that failed in every
iteration, reveals explicitly the three main stages of the
whole process shown in Fig. 3(a): (i) Before the localized
attack, there are a few steps where the cascade describes
the removal of nodes that are not in the MGC, so 〈r〉 is
close to the average distance from the center to all nodes
(∼ 1500). (ii) Random branching process [55, 56] in lim-
ited annulus around the hole (demonstrated in Fig. 3
(b)) so 〈r〉 is fixed for many iterations at distance ≈ a2 ·ζ.
(iii) Spatial spreading process that propagates the whole
iv
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FIG. 4: Analysis of the cascading failures near the
critical point. (a) The average distance from the center,
〈r〉, of the nodes that fail at every iteration, with a linear fit
for the spatial spreading phase. (b) The size of the MGC,
P∞, as a function of NOI. (c) The derivative of P∞ with
comparison in the spatial spreading process to Eq. (8). For
this figure L = 4000, ζ = 50, 〈k〉 = 2.5 and rh = 69, the same
runs as Fig. 3.
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FIG. 5: Dependence of the critical attack size rch on the
system size L. We see that above a certain value of L the
critical attack size rch is constant. For this figure 〈k〉 = 2.5,
with 5 runs for each data point.
system (demonstrated in Fig. 3 (c)), so 〈r〉 increases
linearly as a function of number of iterations (NOI). In-
deed we can see the effect of the three above processes in
Fig. 4(b) — the size of the MGC, P∞, at first decreases
sharply, then, after the attack in ta, it decreases very
slowly in a plateau, and then parabolically as a function
of NOI. Additionally, the processes are also described in
the supplementary on the discussion about the branching
factor.
In the spreading process we can see the cascading dy-
namics both in the simulations for 〈r〉(t) and in the sim-
ulations for ∂P∞(t)∂t in Fig. 4(c). The connection between
them is expressed in the equations below so that t ex-
presses the NOI and v, that sets the speed of the cascad-
ing, is ∼ 0.6ζ,
〈r〉(t) ∼= vt+ rch (6)
∂P∞(t)
∂t
∼= −P∞(ta)
L2
· ∂[pi(vt+ r
c
h)
2 − pirch2]
∂t
(7)
∂P∞(t)
∂t
∼= −2piP∞(ta)v
2
L2
· t− 2piP∞(ta)vr
c
h
L2
. (8)
Understanding the dynamical process of cascading can
explain why in the metastable region, when the size of
the network crosses the size of our approximated random
network (around point L ≈ 2aζ in Fig. 5), there is no
correlation between the critical attack size rch and the
system size. This is because once the network is large
enough for a damage spreading process to take place, the
hole will spread until the damage reaches the edges of the
system, regardless of its size.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have presented a study of interdependent spatial
networks with a novel and realistic combination of spa-
tially localized damage and connectivity links which are
longer than the dependency links. This combination is
ubiquitous in nature, and yet has not been studied me-
thodically, to our knowledge. We find that a nucleation
phenomenon can be triggered by local damage, with fail-
ures spreading through the entire system. The cascade
itself has multi-universal behavior—random on a small
scale but spatial on a large scale—complementing the
static bi-universality in the single layer case [47]. We
further find that the critical nucleation size has novel
scaling features. Future research will determine whether
this indicates a general, universal feature of nucleation
transitions.
Acknowledgement
The authors acknowledge the Israel Science Founda-
tion, Israel Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)
with the Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOST with
vthe Japan Science and Technology Agency, ONR and
DTRA for financial support. MMD thanks the Azrieli
Foundation for the award of an Azrieli Fellowship grant.
[1] Matthew Doar and Ian Leslie. How bad is naive multicast
routing? In INFOCOM’93. Proceedings. Twelfth Annual
Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communi-
cations Societies. Networking: Foundation for the Future,
IEEE, pages 82–89. IEEE, 1993.
[2] Liming Wei and Deborah Estrin. A comparison of multi-
cast trees and algorithms. Submitted to INFOCOM, 94,
1993.
[3] Ellen W Zegura, Kenneth L Calvert, and Michael J Don-
ahoo. A quantitative comparison of graph-based models
for internet topology. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Net-
working (TON), 5(6):770–783, 1997.
[4] Duncan J. Watts and Steven H. Strogatz. Collective dy-
namics of ‘small-world’ networks. Nature, 393(6684):440–
442, Jun 1998.
[5] Mathew Penrose. Random geometric graphs, volume 5.
Oxford University Press Oxford, 2003.
[6] Jon Kleinberg. The small-world phenomenon: An algo-
rithmic perspective. In Proceedings of the thirty-second
annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages
163–170. ACM, 2000.
[7] K. Kosmidis, S. Havlin, and A. Bunde. Structural prop-
erties of spatially embedded networks. EPL (Europhysics
Letters), 82(4):48005, 2008.
[8] Daqing Li, Kosmas Kosmidis, Armin Bunde, and Shlomo
Havlin. Dimension of spatially embedded networks. Na-
ture Physics, 7(6):481–484, Feb 2011.
[9] Thomas C. McAndrew, Christopher M. Danforth, and
James P. Bagrow. Robustness of spatial micronetworks.
Phys. Rev. E, 91:042813, Apr 2015.
[10] James Peerenboom, R Fischer, and Ronald Whitfield.
Recovering from disruptions of interdependent critical
infrastructures. In Proc. CRIS/DRM/IIIT/NSF Work-
shop Mitigat. Vulnerab. Crit. Infrastruct. Catastr. Fail-
ures, 2001.
[11] S.M. Rinaldi, J.P. Peerenboom, and T.K. Kelly. Identify-
ing, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure
interdependencies. Control Systems, IEEE, 21(6):11–25,
2001.
[12] V. Rosato, L. Issacharoff, F. Tiriticco, S. Meloni, S. De
Porcellinis, and R. Setola. Modelling interdependent in-
frastructures using interacting dynamical models. In-
ternational Journal of Critical Infrastructures, 4(1/2):63,
2008.
[13] Richard Bookstaber and Dror Y Kenett. Looking deeper,
seeing more: A multilayer map of the financial system.
OFR Brief, 16(06), 2016.
[14] Antonio Majdandzic, Lidia A Braunstein, Chester
Curme, Irena Vodenska, Sary Levy-Carciente, H Eugene
Stanley, and Shlomo Havlin. Multiple tipping points and
optimal repairing in interacting networks. Nature com-
munications, 7, 2016.
[15] W. Li, D. Y. Kenett, K. Yamasaki, H. E. Stanley, and
S. Havlin. Ranking the Economic Importance of Coun-
tries and Industries. ArXiv e-prints, August 2014.
[16] Sergey V. Buldyrev, Roni Parshani, Gerald Paul, H. Eu-
gene Stanley, and Shlomo Havlin. Catastrophic cas-
cade of failures in interdependent networks. Nature,
464(7291):1025–1028, Apr 2010.
[17] Jianxi Gao, Sergey V. Buldyrev, H. Eugene Stanley, and
Shlomo Havlin. Networks formed from interdependent
networks. Nature Physics, 8(1):40–48, 2012.
[18] Jianxi Gao, Sergey V. Buldyrev, Shlomo Havlin, and
H. Eugene Stanley. Robustness of a Network of Net-
works. Phys. Rev. Lett., 107:195701, Nov 2011.
[19] G. J. Baxter, S. N. Dorogovtsev, A. V. Goltsev, and
J. F. F. Mendes. Avalanche Collapse of Interdependent
Networks. Phys. Rev. Lett., 109:248701, Dec 2012.
[20] Mikko Kivela¨, Alex Arenas, Marc Barthe´le´my, James P.
Gleeson, Yamir Moreno, and Mason A. Porter. Multi-
layer networks. Journal of Complex Networks, 2(3):203–
271, 2014.
[21] Manlio De Domenico, Albert Sole´-Ribalta, Emanuele
Cozzo, Mikko Kivela¨, Yamir Moreno, Mason A. Porter,
Sergio Go´mez, and Alex Arenas. Mathematical formula-
tion of multilayer networks. Phys. Rev. X, 3:041022, Dec
2013.
[22] Ginestra Bianconi. Statistical mechanics of multiplex
networks: Entropy and overlap. Phys. Rev. E, 87:062806,
Jun 2013.
[23] S Boccaletti, G Bianconi, R Criado, CI Del Ge-
nio, J Go´mez-Garden˜es, M Romance, I Sendina-Nadal,
Z Wang, and M Zanin. The structure and dynamics of
multilayer networks. Physics Reports, 2014.
[24] Jianxi Gao, Daqing Li, and Shlomo Havlin. From a sin-
gle network to a network of networks. National Science
Review, 1(3):346–356, 2014.
[25] Weiran Cai, Li Chen, Fakhteh Ghanbarnejad, and Peter
Grassberger. Avalanche outbreaks emerging in coopera-
tivecontagions. Nature Physics, 11(11):936940, Sep 2015.
[26] Yanqing Hu, Shlomo Havlin, and Herna´n A. Makse. Con-
ditions for viral influence spreading through multiplex
correlated social networks. Phys. Rev. X, 4:021031, May
2014.
[27] Michael M. Danziger, Louis M. Shekhtman, Amir
Bashan, Yehiel Berezin, and Shlomo Havlin. Vulnera-
bility of interdependent networks and networks of net-
works. In Antonios Garas, editor, Interconnected Net-
works, pages 79–99. Springer International Publishing,
Cham, 2016.
[28] Marc Barthe´le´my. Spatial networks. Physics Reports,
499(13):1 – 101, 2011.
[29] Amir Bashan, Yehiel Berezin, Sergey V. Buldyrev, and
Shlomo Havlin. The extreme vulnerability of interde-
pendent spatially embedded networks. Nature Physics,
9:667–672, Aug 2013.
[30] Wei Li, Amir Bashan, Sergey V. Buldyrev, H. Eugene
Stanley, and Shlomo Havlin. Cascading Failures in In-
terdependent Lattice Networks: The Critical Role of
the Length of Dependency Links. Phys. Rev. Lett.,
108:228702, May 2012.
[31] Michael M. Danziger, Amir Bashan, Yehiel Berezin, and
Shlomo Havlin. Percolation and cascade dynamics of spa-
tial networks with partial dependency. Journal of Com-
vi
plex Networks, 2(4):460–474, 2014.
[32] Louis M. Shekhtman, Yehiel Berezin, Michael M.
Danziger, and Shlomo Havlin. Robustness of a network
formed of spatially embedded networks. Phys. Rev. E,
90:012809, Jul 2014.
[33] Andrea Asztalos, Sameet Sreenivasan, Boleslaw K. Szy-
manski, and Gyorgy Korniss. Cascading failures in
spatially-embedded random networks. PLoS ONE,
9(1):e84563, 01 2014.
[34] Michael M Danziger, Amir Bashan, and Shlomo Havlin.
Interdependent resistor networks with process-based de-
pendency. New Journal of Physics, 17(4):043046, 2015.
[35] Kyu-Min Lee, Byungjoon Min, and Kwang-Il Goh. To-
wards real-world complexity: an introduction to multi-
plex networks. Eur. Phys. J. B, 88(2), Feb 2015.
[36] S. Neumayer, G. Zussman, R. Cohen, and E. Modiano.
Assessing the impact of geographically correlated net-
work failures. In Military Communications Conference,
2008. MILCOM 2008. IEEE, pages 1–6, 2008.
[37] Pankaj K. Agarwal, A. Efrat, S. Ganjugunte, D. Hay,
S. Sankararaman, and G. Zussman. The resilience of
WDM networks to probabilistic geographical failures. In
INFOCOM, 2011 Proceedings IEEE, pages 1521–1529,
2011.
[38] Yehiel Berezin, Amir Bashan, Michael. M. Danziger,
Daqing Li, and Shlomo Havlin. Localized attacks on spa-
tially embedded networks with dependencies. Scientific
Reports, 5, March 2015.
[39] Shuai Shao, Xuqing Huang, H Eugene Stanley, and
Shlomo Havlin. Percolation of localized attack on com-
plex networks. New Journal of Physics, 17(2):023049,
2015.
[40] Xin Yuan, Shuai Shao, H. Eugene Stanley, and Shlomo
Havlin. How breadth of degree distribution influences
network robustness: Comparing localized and random
attacks. Phys. Rev. E, 92:032122, Sep 2015.
[41] Xin Yuan, Yang Dai, H. Eugene Stanley, and Shlomo
Havlin. k-core percolation on complex networks: Com-
paring random, localized, and targeted attacks. Phys.
Rev. E, 93:062302, Jun 2016.
[42] KeSheng Yan, LiLi Rong, Tao Lu, and ZiJian Ni. A
Framework for Analyzing Vulnerability of Critical In-
frastructures Under Localized Attacks, pages 94–103.
Springer Singapore, Singapore, 2016.
[43] Fuyu Hu, Chi Ho Yeung, Saini Yang, Weiping Wang,
and An Zeng. Recovery of infrastructure networks after
localised attacks. Scientific Reports, 6:24522, Apr 2016.
[44] Baichao Wu, Aiping Tang, and Jie Wu. Modeling cascad-
ing failures in interdependent infrastructures under ter-
rorist attacks. Reliability Engineering & System Safety,
147:18, Mar 2016.
[45] Min Ouyang. Critical location identification and vulner-
ability analysis of interdependent infrastructure systems
under spatially localized attacks. Reliability Engineering
& System Safety, 154:106 – 116, 2016.
[46] Michael M. Danziger, Louis M. Shekhtman, Yehiel
Berezin, and Shlomo Havlin. The effect of spatial-
ity on multiplex networks. EPL (Europhysics Letters),
115(3):36002, 2016.
[47] Bnaya Gross, Dana Vaknin, Michael M. Danziger, and
Shlomo Havlin. Multi-universality and localized attacks
in spatially embedded networks. Japan Physics Society,
2017.
[48] Saleh Soltan and Gil Zussman. Generation of syn-
thetic spatially embedded power grid networks. CoRR,
abs/1508.04447, 2015.
[49] B.M. Waxman. Routing of multipoint connections.
Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on,
6(9):1617–1622, Dec 1988.
[50] Arda Halu, Satyam Mukherjee, and Ginestra Bianconi.
Emergence of overlap in ensembles of spatial multiplexes
and statistical mechanics of spatial interacting network
ensembles. Phys. Rev. E, 89:012806, Jan 2014.
[51] Ginestra Bianconi, Sergey N. Dorogovtsev, and Jose´ F. F.
Mendes. Mutually connected component of networks of
networks with replica nodes. Phys. Rev. E, 91:012804,
Jan 2015.
[52] Davide Cellai, Sergey N. Dorogovtsev, and Ginestra
Bianconi. Message passing theory for percolation models
on multiplex networks with link overlap. Phys. Rev. E,
94:032301, Sep 2016.
[53] Robert McGraw and Ari Laaksonen. Scaling properties of
the critical nucleus in classical and molecular-based theo-
ries of vapor-liquid nucleation. Phys. Rev. Lett., 76:2754–
2757, Apr 1996.
[54] V. Talanquer. A new phenomenological approach to
gas-liquid nucleation based on the scaling properties
of the critical nucleus. Journal of Chemical Physics,
106(23):9957–9960, 6 1997.
[55] Dong Zhou, Amir Bashan, Reuven Cohen, Yehiel
Berezin, Nadav Shnerb, and Shlomo Havlin. Simulta-
neous first- and second-order percolation transitions in
interdependent networks. Phys. Rev. E, 90:012803, Jul
2014.
[56] Deokjae Lee, S. Choi, M. Stippinger, J. Kerte´sz, and
B. Kahng. Hybrid phase transition into an absorb-
ing state: Percolation and avalanches. Phys. Rev. E,
93:042109, Apr 2016.
vii
25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
NOI
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
η
FIG. 6: The branching factor η in the random branching process (NOI < 125) and in the spatial spreading process
(NOI > 125), with η = 1 marked in red. In this figure L = 4000, ζ = 50, 〈k〉 = 2.5 and rh = 69 (same run as in Figs. 3-4 in
the main text).
Supplementary
Appendix A: Branching Process
The branching factor η is defined as the ratio between the number of nodes that collapse at a given iteration to
the nodes that collapsed in the previous iteration. In Fig. 6 we see that η exhibits different behavior in the two
main processes that occur after the attack. In the initial random-like stage, when the nodes fall slowly in the annulus
around the hole, η is noisy with an average value of one, meaning the number of the nodes that fail in every iteration
is the same on average, though with considerable deviations, as observed in random networks [55]. Then, when the
damage propagates in a spreading cascade, η is consistently above one (NOI > 125), meaning that the number of
nodes that fail in every iteration is growing. There is a decreasing trend in η, reflecting the flattening of the interface
(Fig. 3(c) in main text) as its radius increases. In the limit of an infinite radius of curvature (i.e., a propagating
strip), the number of nodes failing in each step will be nearly identical to the previous step and η ≈ 1.
These results strengthen our claim that, following a critical localized attack, there is a random cascade followed
by a spatial cascade. At first we have the branching process phenomena that characterize the critical cascade of an
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi multiplex, after which we see that the damage rate reflects collapse propagation like a typical spreading
process in a spatial system.
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FIG. 7: The critical attack size rch as a function of ζ for four 〈k〉 values, with the fit from the theory for large ζ and small
ζ with a = 3.2. For these simulations, L = 2000 with averages over 5 realizations for each data point.
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FIG. 8: The average distance from the center 〈r〉, of the nodes that fail at every iteration, divided by ζ, with y = a/2
marked in red, for two ζ values. For this figure L = 4000.
Appendix B: Uniform link-length distribution with strict length cut-off at ζ
The model in the main text had exponential link-lengths distribution which was found to be well approximated
as uniformly random up to the characteristic length (ζ) multiplied by a constant a ≈ 9. We thus hypothesize that
similar random-like topologies tiled on a lattice will demonstrate similar behavior, with possible corrections to the
constant a. Here we consider a multiplex composed of two layers in which the nodes are placed at lattice sites of a
square lattice where the average degree is 〈k〉 and the link length distribution is uniform up to ζ (step function, i.e.,
no links above length ζ).
In Fig. 7, we see the results for this system which are explained with the same theory as the model in the main text,
but with a modified coefficient a. In this case, there are no long links as in the model in the main text, so a — the
constant of proportionality for the effective network size — is significantly smaller, and from numerical calculations
we find a ≈ 3.2. The length a · ζ can be regarded the effective radius of the random network.
In addition, when analyzing the cascading failures near the critical point in Fig. 8, we see that the behavior of 〈r〉
(the average distance from the center of the nodes that failed in every iteration) is consistent with our theory for our
original model. We find that in the random branching process, 〈r〉 is constant for many iterations at distance ≈ a2 · ζ,
but with the lower value of a ≈ 3.2. And additionally, we see that in the spatial spreading process, the slope is fixed,
meaning that the velocity of the cascading has linear dependent in ζ, as in our original model.
